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The daily percentage was the whole trick. Everything else was decoration.

Two promoters have pleaded guilty. The co-founder is charged and abroad. The math that pulled in $1.89 billion was the oldest math in the file, dressed in new vocabulary.

The daily percentage was the whole trick. Everything else was decoration.

Miguel checked the number before his shift.

He was forty-seven, a warehouse supervisor in Bakersfield, and he had a habit of eating a granola bar in his truck at 5:40 in the morning while his phone woke up. The app was bookmarked on the home screen. HyperFund. The dashboard loaded a balance and, next to it, a small green figure that ticked up every day by roughly one percent.

One percent. Not a week. Not a month. A day.

His cousin had walked him through it the summer before, over a paper plate of carne asada in a backyard in Delano. There was a laptop on the folding table. There was a man on a YouTube video his cousin kept pausing to explain. The man on the video was calm and well-dressed and used the word "membership." He said the rewards came from cryptocurrency mining. He said there was a Fortune 500 partnership. He said the technology was what mattered.

Miguel put in eight thousand dollars. His cousin put in more.

For a while, the number went up every day exactly the way it was supposed to.

I.

The name of the company kept changing.

HyperFund. HyperTech. HyperCapital. HyperVerse. HyperNation. According to the Department of Justice, all of them were the same scheme, operating from approximately June 2020 through November 2022. The DOJ's number for the total taken is $1.89 billion. The SEC's parallel civil case puts investor funds raised worldwide at over $1.7 billion.

The pitch was simple enough to run in a backyard. Buy a membership. Earn 0.5 to 1 percent daily rewards. Keep earning until your principal doubles or triples. The rewards, investors were told, came from large-scale crypto mining operations and a Fortune 500 relationship.

The DOJ and SEC allege both were fiction. There were no mining operations at that scale. There was no Fortune 500 partner. The daily rewards, prosecutors say, were paid from the deposits of newer members. That is the definition of a Ponzi scheme. That is also the definition of a pyramid, when the recruiting is built into the payout structure. HyperFund was both, at the same time, running in parallel.

If you want the plainest version: money came in the front door and went out the front door, and the software in between just kept score.

II.

The public-facing name of the machine was Sam Lee.

Xue Lee, an Australian citizen residing in Dubai, is charged by the DOJ with one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and wire fraud. The SEC filed a parallel civil action. Prosecutors describe him as using his "public-facing crypto asset persona" to make HyperFund look legitimate. He remains outside U.S. custody. Those charges are allegations. They have not been adjudicated.

The two people who have pleaded guilty are the promoters.

Brenda Chunga, known online as "Bitcoin Beautee," pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit securities fraud and wire fraud. Court documents state she received at least $3 million in proceeds from the scheme and spent it on a million-dollar house, a million-dollar condo in Dubai, a BMW, and designer handbags. Her sentencing was continued from June to January 7, 2027.

Rodney Burton, known as "Bitcoin Rodney," pleaded guilty on June 15, 2026, to one count of conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business. Court documents put his cut at least $7.85 million. His sentencing is scheduled for July 23, 2026.

Read those two numbers slowly. $3 million to one promoter. $7.85 million to another. That is what the top of the recruiting pyramid earned before the pyramid stopped paying anyone at the bottom.

III.

Miguel did not know any of the names.

He knew his cousin. He knew the man on the YouTube video. He knew the dashboard, and he knew, by late June of 2021, that his balance was showing a number bigger than any savings account he had ever held. He told his sister about it at a birthday party. She was polite. She did not sign up.

In July 2021, the withdrawal button stopped working the way it used to.

According to the SEC's filings, HyperFund began blocking or restricting investor withdrawals in at least July 2021. For a lot of members, the dashboard kept ticking. The number kept climbing. The green figure kept going up by roughly one percent a day. What changed was the exit. Getting money out required new hoops. New tokens. New "upgrades." New reasons the money was still there but not, at this particular moment, retrievable.

This is how a Ponzi ends without ending. The scoreboard keeps running. The bank does not.

By late 2022, the scheme had collapsed entirely.

IV.

I want to be honest about something.

I have audited protocols that were technically clean and got looted anyway. I have sat in Discord servers and told strangers that the smart contract was fine. Sometimes the smart contract was fine. The founders were not. There is a specific kind of shame that lives behind that memory, and it is the reason I read the HyperFund filings the way a mechanic reads a totaled car.

The tell in HyperFund was not hidden. It was the number.

One percent a day, compounded, is roughly a 3,678 percent annual return. No mining operation, legitimate or otherwise, generates that. No fund does. No asset class does. The only structure that pays a daily percentage forever is a structure that is being fed by new deposits. When the deposits slow, the dashboard freezes. That is not a bug. That is the design.

The vocabulary was new. The math was from the 1920s.

V.

Miguel stopped checking the dashboard sometime in the fall of 2022.

By then his cousin was not answering texts about it. There was a Telegram group that had gone quiet, then loud with anger, then quiet again. The videos of the calm well-dressed man were still on YouTube. Some of them still are. If you search the names on a good afternoon you can find the pitch decks and the promotional livestreams and the testimonials, uploaded and monetized, from the era when the number was still climbing.

Miguel did not lose everything. He lost eight thousand dollars. He lost a relationship with his cousin, or something close to it. He lost the version of himself that believed his cousin would not have handed him something dangerous over carne asada.

That part may be the quietest cost. It does not show up in any filing.

VI.

On July 8, 2026, two days before the anniversary of the withdrawal freeze that started HyperFund's slow collapse, the SEC announced the formation of a Retail Fraud Working Group. The stated focus is retail-facing crypto fraud, microcap promotions, online investment schemes, and digital asset scams. The FBI's 2025 numbers put losses to cryptocurrency fraud at approximately $11.4 billion, with investment scams alone accounting for roughly $7.2 billion.

Two promoters have pleaded guilty. A co-founder is charged and abroad. A new working group has been announced.

None of that gives Miguel his eight thousand dollars back. None of it un-holds the plate of carne asada.

The machine does not need Sam Lee to run again. It never did. It needs a dashboard, a daily percentage, a cousin at a backyard table, and a word that sounds new enough to make an old trick look like technology.

The word this time was crypto.

The math was the same math it has always been.

Evidence Trail
  1. U.S. Department of Justice | 2024-2026 | Indictments and plea agreements in United States v. Lee, United States v. Chunga, United States v. Burton
  2. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission | January 29, 2024 | Complaint against Xue Lee (a/k/a Sam Lee) and Brenda Chunga
  3. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission | July 8, 2026 | Announcement of Retail Fraud Working Group
  4. Federal Bureau of Investigation | 2025 | Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) annual report on cryptocurrency fraud losses
  5. Yahoo News / Google News aggregation | July 10, 2026 | "US crypto founder pleads guilty to wire fraud after taking in $400M, buying 30 Rolexes"
  6. Court docket, U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland | June 15, 2026 | Rodney Burton guilty plea
— Mark Tell, Editor

Editorial Notice

MarkTell is a true crime publication about financial fraud. Some scenes, dialogue, and sequential details are reconstructed from court filings, enforcement actions, news reports, and public records. Where the public record does not provide exact details, editorial reconstruction is used to convey the documented pattern of events. Names of private individuals may be changed to protect identity. All factual claims are sourced to public documents cited in the Evidence Trail above. MarkTell does not provide investment, legal, or financial advice. Nothing published here constitutes a recommendation to buy, sell, or avoid any investment. Allegations described in active cases have not been adjudicated and defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. Readers should conduct their own due diligence before making financial decisions.